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Chapter 2 
Sweden in the 1930's: Population 
Development, Population Debate 
and Policy Implications 
 
Ann-Sofie Kälvemark 
What were the main characteristics of Swedish population development and, 
in particular, fertility patterns up to and including the 1930's? To what extent 
and in what way were they reflected in the debate on and decisions concerning 
population policy? And finally, what policy impact could be expected with 
regard to pertinent theories on fertility and given the specific characteristics of 
Sweden in the 1930's—political, economic and social? 
These are the main questions to be answered in this chapter. The problem of 
population versus social policy will also be considered, particularly in the 
context of an analysis of Alva and Gunnar Myrdal's writings on the subject. 
Swedish Demographic Patterns in the 1930's 
Falling birth rates were the immediate, obvious cause of the fervid European 
interest in population in the 1930's. In many countries, among them Sweden, 
the net reproduction rate fell far below unity and a rapid population decline 
was prophesied. 
Sweden stands out as the country with the lowest birth rate (Table 1). The 
Swedish net reproduction rate was also among the lowest in Europe. 
What kind of population patterns, especially with regard to fertility and 
nuptiality, were prevalent in the situation the policy-makers intended to affect? 
Were, furthermore, such patterns homogeneous and uniform all over the 
country, or were there differences? If there were differences were they attribut- 
able to social, economic and cultural factors and conditions? 
First, an overall outline of Swedish population history will be briefly present- 
ed. Diagram 1 gives the essential factors in Swedish population development 
from the beginning of national statistics in 1750 up to 1967. The continuous 
growth of the population becomes especially accentuated after 1810, when a 
decisive fall in mortality (the first stage of the demographic transition) occurs. 
Some sixty years later a corresponding fall in the crude birth rate sets in 
38 
   
Inhabitants 
mill. 
1750 
—— Birth rates 
__ Death rates rrvrth         / / /   Massemigration period /// Massemigration period I     
 
Diagram 1. Crude rates of bi
Sweden 1750—1967. 
Source: Historisk statistik för Sv
Table 1. Crude birth rates for 
1899/01  1
 
Belgium  29.1  23.4
Denmark  29.8  27.5
Germany  35.4  29.8
England   
and Wales  28.7  24.2
Finland  32.4  29.9
France  21.7  19.3
Italy  33.1  32.5
Holland  32.1  28.7
Norway  29.8  26.3
Switzerland  28.9  24.9
Sweden  26.8  24.7
Source: Bickel 1947. Pbpubtion g   Populationgrowthrth and death 
erige. Del 1. Be
various Europe
909/11  1919/2
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folkning 1720-1967, pp. 48, 87. 
an countries 1899-1937 
1  1929/31  1931/35  1936 1937 
18.4  16.8  15.2  15.3  
18.4  17.7  17.8  18.0  
17.2  16.6  19.0  18.8  
 
16.1  15.0  14.8  14.9  
22.3  19.5  19.1  19.9  
17.7  16.5  15.0  14.7  
25.7  23.8  22.4  22.9  
22.7  21.1  20.2  19.8  
17.0  15.2  14.6  15.1  
17.0  16.4  15.6  14.9  
15.2  14.1  14.2  14.4  
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Diagram 2. Crude marriage rates for decades. Sweden 1751-1970 (per 1 000 mean population). 
Source: E. Hofsten-H. Lundström, Swedish Population History. Main Trends from 1750 to 1970, p. 33. 
reaching its lowest level in the middle of the 1930's and completing the 
demographic transition. 
Diagram 2 provides similar information on the crude marriage rate, where a 
decrease begins from about the second decade of the 19th century and reaches 
its lowest level in 1900, after which a rapid rise sets in up to the middle of the 
1940's. 
Crude rates only provide information of the relation between the demo- 
graphic events and the total population, but are insufficient for more subtle 
purposes of interpreting changing fertility and nuptiality patterns. Table 2 
therefore gives information of marital age-specific fertility rates between 1751 
to 1970, that is the number of children born (or confinements) in relation to the 
number of married women in each specific age-group. The decisive fall in 
fertility here emerges as from 1880 and onwards—the quinquennium 1866-70 
is atypical because of the severe demographic crisis in 1868 and 1869 due to 
extremely bad harvests. 
Secular trends in demographic events may, however, be disrupted by short- 
term influences from, for example, business cycles. The relationship between 
these two phenomena in the explanations of the low birth rate in the 1930's will 
not be discussed here, but the reader should bear in mind that both played 
central roles in the contemporary discussion about low fertility in Sweden. 
The main concern in the 1930's was, however, replacement rates—would 
the living generations be fully replaced by their children or would the low birth 
rates result in a decline in the population? 1 
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1 A. Myrdal 1941, p. 8. Cf. also below pp. 52 IT. 
Table 2. Age-specific marital fertility rates in Sweden 1751-1970. Legitimate live births 
(up to 1955 confinements) per 1 000 married women. 
 
Age of mother  
Years  15-19  20-24  25-29  30-34  35-39  40-44  45-49  
Total 
15-44  
1751/55  _  483  416  353  245  134  31  319.3  
56/60  -  451  387  325  226  122  31  292.7  
61/65  -  446  386  333  230  124  31  292.2  
66/70  -  440  376  334  233  123  31  290.3  
71/75  -  445  345  302  219  118  29  273.0  
76/80  -  454  372  333  239  135  35  299.2  
81/85  -  448  357  298  215  113  28  275.3  
86/90  -  469  367  313  212  118  28  277.6  
91/95  -  479  404  341  226  123  29  293.0  
96/00  -  459  389  332  231  117  28  286.4  
1801/05  -  466  379  314  226  120  26  280.8  
06/10  -  445  369  300  214  115  27  271.3  
11/15  -  459  377  318  232  121  26  287.6  
16/20  -  458  379  319  237  132  26  290.1  
21/25  -  472  395  335  251  140  28  304.5  
26/30  -  449  373  315  238  134  26  287.0  
31/35  -  448  370  312  239  136  24  283.1  
36/40  -  448  366  307  235  130  24  277.3  
41/45  -  459  375  318  245  138  23  289.8  
46/50  -  455  366  315  245  135  23  287.4  
51/55  -  457  373  320  247  141  22  290.1  
56/60  -  483  383  334  268  154  27  302.2  
61/65  -  469  386  333  266  163  26  300.7  
66/70  -  445  365  308  250  142  24  278.2  
71/75  -  482  389  333  265  158  24  300.0  
76/80  -  468  390  333  267  153  26  301.9  
81/85  -  447  376  325  258  150  23  294.5  
86/90  -  447  372  318  253  142  22  289.3  
91/95  -  456  365  307  243  136  20  278.8  
96/00  -  467  369  297  234  129  17  273.4  
1901/05  610  456  359  286  218  118  16  259.8  
06/10  629  450  341  270  205  107  14  250.4  
11/15  594  404  299  232  178  94  11  223.1  
16/20  596  392  211  209  154  80  10  200.7  
21/25  602  354  242  178  130  66  8  173.8  
26/30  575  309  199  140  98  48  6  138.0  
31/35  531  273  173  120  77  35  4  116.8  
36/40  518  261  170  118  73  30  3  114.6  
41/45  550  288  198  140  86  31  3  134.8  
46/50  555  281  186  125  75  28  2  124.5  
51/55  543  268  167  102  56  19  2  104.4  
56/60  524  267  172  99  48  15  1  101.2  
61/65  523  275  183  99  44  12  1  107.2  
66/70  440  243  170  87  36  8  1  102.9  
Source: Hofsten-Lundström 1976, p. 30. 
Table 3. Generation gross, net, and actual replacement rates by cohort 1870/71-1924/252 
Replacement rates 
                                                     
2 The reason for relating each cohort to two years is that the age of the 
mother and not her year of birth is given. Births to women of a given age in 
a given calendar year actually cover two years, if birth cohorts are 
considered. Bernhardt 1971, p. 9. 
  
Year of birth Gross Net Actual 
 
1870/71  1 795  1 239  991  
74/75  1 727  1 239  947  
78/79  1 619  1 129  945  
82/83  1 480  1 053  904  
86/87  1 329  973  851  
90/91  1 222  900  830  
94/95  1 089  829  786  
98/99  960  729  706  
1902/03  883  708  682  
06/07  892  733  719  
10/11  910  762  761  
14/15  971  823  835  
18/19  968  848  868  
19/20  1 043  922  940  
20/21  976  868  887  
21/22  1 007  899  930  
22/23  983  882  922  
23/24  1 002  903  952  
24/25  993  899   
Source: Bernhardt 1971, pp. 12 f. 
Table 3 presents the gross and net reproduction rates, together with the 
actual replacement rate (which measures the actual number of children born to 
each cohort of women, divided by the size of the cohort) for Sweden from 1870 
to 1925.3 
The actual replacement rate is lower than the other rates up to 1910/11; 
 
                                                     
3 The gross reproduction (or replacement) rate predicting how many daughters on the 
average each woman of a generation would have during her childbearing period, indicates 
the possibility of a generation replacing itself. This rate is based on the number of women 
born in a certain year or during a certain period.  However, some of them will die before 
passing through their entire childbearing period. To correct for this, the gross reproduction 
rate can be reduced—for each age—by the proportion that would not survive on the basis of 
current age-specific death rates. The resulting rate, which is lower than the gross 
reproduction rate, is called the net reproduction rate. The difference between the two rates is, 
of course, dependent on female mortality. Cf. Petersen 1969, pp. 82 f. 
 
Table 4. Per cent ever-married at age 50 and mean age at first marriage for birth cohorts 
of Swedish women, 1870/71-1917/18 
 
Cohort  
Per cent ever- 
married at age 50  
Mean age at 
first marriage  
1870/71  76.8  27.1  
74/75  76.2  27.0  
78/79  75.8  26.9  
86/87  75.9  26.9  
90/91  77.2  26.9  
94/95  78.5  27.0  
98/99  78.1  27.2  
1902/03  80.1  27.4  
06/07  84.8  27.2  
10/11  86.9  26.7  
14/15  89.9  26.0  
15/16  89.0  25.7  
16/17  91.4  25.6  
17/18  91.2  25.2  
Source: Bernhardt 1971, p. 19. 
afterwards it is higher. This was due to the effects of emigration and immigra- 
tion. As long as the original birth cohorts were decimated by emigration as 
well as by mortality, the replacement rates were, of course, diminished. But 
when immigration became larger than emigration, the size of the cohorts 
increased accounting for the higher rates for later generations, i.e., those who 
began their childbearing periods around 1930.4 
The Swedish replacement rate thus fell far below unity and the decrease was 
especially rapid from the turn of the century to the middle of the 1930's. This 
development is even more dramatically illustrated when compared with the 
percentage of married women per age-cohort. 
In her book on Swedish fertility, the demographer Eva Bernhardt sums up 
the development from 1870 onwards as "the transition from late and far from 
universal marriage combined with relatively high marital fertility to relatively 
early and almost universal marriage combined with highly controlled fertil- 
ity".5 (Cf. Table 4.) 
Table 5. Parity progression ratios for marriage cohorts 1906/10 and 1943/47, by age 
at marriage of wife 
 
Marriage 
cohorts  
Age at 
marriage a0  al  a2  a3  a4  a5  
1906/10  -20  988  957  902  851  807  775  
 20-24  977  940  861  802  775  759  
 25-29  951  911  827  760  726  685  
1943/47  -20  983  842  622  483  490  (414)  
 20-24 948 779 509 431 400 389  
 25-29  903  700  420  334  352  (420)  
1943/47 if  -20  99.5  88.0  69.0  56.8  60.7  53.4  
1906/10= 100  20-24  97.0  82.9  59.1  53.7  51.6  51.3  
 25-29  95.0  76.8  50.8  43.9  48.5   
                                                     
4 Bernhardt also discusses the influence of mortality on reproduction rates. As long 
as this is declining—as was the case in Sweden during the actual period—the net 
reproduction rates will understate the real extent of population replacement. 
Bernhardt 1971, pp. 16f. 
5 Ibid., p. 70. For a more indepth analysis of the development of female nuptiality 
patterns in Sweden from the 18th century up to the beginning of the 20th century, 
see S. Carlsson 1977 
Source: Bernhardt 1971, p. 76. 
What did these changes mean in terms of family size? Obviously an in- 
creased rate of marriage combined with a lower mean age at marriage and a 
fall in fertility points towards a fall in mean family size. 
Bernhardt compares women marrying in the period 1906—10 to women 
marrying in the period of 1943-47. In the former cohort 4.71 children were 
born per marriage, whereas the corresponding number in the latter was only 
2.25 children per marriage.6 Did some families have a large number of 
children and others none, or was the decrease evenly distributed? Since 
Swedish population registration provides information on the order of births, 
this problem can be solved. In Table 5 parity progression ratios, i.e., the 
propensity to continue from a given parity to the next higher one, are present- 
ed. The ratios are computed by first dividing the number of marriages with one 
birth by the total number, then the number of marriages with two births by 
those with one child and so on.7 
Table 5 shows that it is the occurrence of births of a higher order—the fourth 
or higher—that decreases dramatically. Smaller families thus became the rule. 
Another important consequence is that women ceased to have children after a 
relatively short period of marriage, and accordingly had most of their children 
in their twenties or early thirties. Earlier women often had children late in their 
fertile period. 
The above is, however, only a description of the development of nuptiality, 
fertility and family patterns for the whole of the country. To obtain a more 
                                                     
6 Bernhardt 1971, p. 73.  
7 Ibid., p. 76 
thorough understanding of the demographic situation in Sweden the 
range and characteristics of variations found within this pattern must be 
studied. Simply put, fertility tends to vary with economic and other 
changes. The effects of such changes, however, are not only dependent 
on their intrinsic character but also on the nature of a society, in 
particular the sanctioned forms of marriage and family. Thus the same 
type of change may produce varying results in different contexts. Here 
I will not go into the largely unsolved problem of explaining fertility 
transition in Sweden. It should be kept in mind, however, 
that old patterns will very likely survive far longer among some social 
groups and in some social contexts than in others in the face of ongoing 
economic and social changes. It is also clear that new social patterns 
may be more or less acceptable to different social strata, depending to 
some extent on their desire or ability to identify with the social norms 
and values expressed by those retaining power and the leading 
positions in society. 
 
In a country experiencing great economic change one would thus 
expect great variations within the prevalent demographic pattern. 
What kind of a country, then, was Sweden in the 1930's? How far had 
development gone towards the industrialised, urbanised Sweden of 
today, a typical so-called developed country? 
 
In 1935 the total population of Sweden was 6.2 millions. 66 per cent 
lived in the countryside and 34 per cent in towns.8 The countryside was, 
however, to a large extent industrialised. 26 per cent of the people 
living in the countryside thus lived in villages or some other form of 
population agglomeration. 
 
The decisive start of industrialisation is generally considered to have 
taken place in the last decades of the 19th century. The first thirty 
years of the 20th century are characterised by a remarkably rapid 
development in this sector. Maps 1 and 2 give the increase in numbers 
of industrial workers from 1896 to 1930, and also show that 
industrialisation in Sweden largely took place in the countryside.9 The 
growth of the towns and other densely populated places was, 
however, dramatic from the last decade of the 19th century (cf. 
Diagram 3).10 This development implies considerable transfer of 
population from the agrarian to other sectors of the economy. During 
the 1930's for the first time less people made their livelihood from 
agriculture than from industrial occupations.11 But also within 
agriculture significant changes took place. While in some parts of the 
country the old type of small proprietory farming remained 
unchanged (indeed it often persisted long into the 20th century), in 
central and southern Sweden the large landed estates adopted (even 
before the marjor industrial advances) a highly rationalized, 
commercialised large-scale type of production.12 
                                                     
8 Statistisk årsbok för Sverige 1939, tab. 9. 
9 Cf.  Population Movements and  Industrialization 1941  and Thomas  
1941.  With regard to industrialisation in general in Sweden see 
Montgomery 1939, Gårdlund 1942 and Samuelsson1968. 
10 Historisk  statistik  för Sverige, p. 66. 
11 Ibid., tab. 23. 
12 The most recent work on agricultural change in Sweden is Isacson 1979. 
Cf. also Eriksson & Rogers 1978. Heckscher 1941 gives an overall picture 
of economic development within agriculture in Sweden. Cf. Also Dovring 
1953 and Samuelsson 1968. Utterström 1957 concentrates on agricultural 
 
Maps 1 and 2: Industrial workers in rural areas and towns, by  
counties 1896 and 1930. 
Source: Population Movements and Industrialization, pp. 14, 12.
                                                                                                               
labour. Eriksson & Rogers 1978, Löfgren 1977, Martinius 1977 and 
Winberg 1975 all treat different aspects of changes in the agricultural 
economy and their relations to population patterns and proletarianisation. 
 
 
  
  
 
Diagram 3. Population in rural and urban districts and in sparsely and densely populated areas. 
Sweden 1800-1965. 
Source: Historisk statistik för Sverige. Del 1. Befolkning 1720-1967, p. 67. 
Sweden in the 1930’ was thus a far from homogenous country – it was a 
country which not only had experienced tremendous change but was still 
experiencing rapid change in a whole range of areas. It is therefore not 
surprising that fertility and nuptiality patterns showed great variations. Since 
our knowledge of fertility and nuptiality is based on locally and regionally 
collected statistics, the most convenient way of presenting information on 
them, although from an analytical point of view seldom the most satisfactory, 
is by geographical area. 
Fertility in Sweden during the 19th century was described by the prominent 
Swedish statistician Gustav Sundbärg as varying significantly from area to 
area. He observed three different demographic regions in Sweden. "Eastern" 
Sweden had low ages at marriage but also low fertility, whereas the reverse 
was true of "western" Sweden. The "colonisation" areas in Norrland were 
remarkable for an extremely high fertility.13 How much of this roughly 
outlined pattern was still in existence in the 1930's? 
In 1938 two statisticians, S. D. Wicksell and C.-E. Quensel, investigated the 
regional distribution of fertility in Sweden in 1928-33 on behalf of the Commit- 
tee on Population.14 They stated that the regional differences observed by 
Sundbärg were still in existence, though modified. The marital fertility rate 
was lowest in two län in the middle of Sweden, Örebro and Stockholm län, 
whereas the highest marital fertility was still to be found in the very north of 
the country.15 Variations within the same län could, however, be great. If the 
47 
                                                     
13 Emigrationsutredningen, bil. V, pp. 4 f. 
14 Wicksell & Quensel 1938. 
15 Ibid., p. 74. 
  
Map 3. Marital fertility 1931-40. Regional differences. 
Source: E. Hofsten-H. Lundström. Swedish Population History. Main Trends from 1750 to 1970, Table 
6.17. 
average rate for the whole of the country is given the value of one hundred, the 
rate within, for instance, Göteborgs and Bohus län varied from 70 to 187. The 
lowest rate in the country, 48, was in the town of Örebro and the highest, 282, 
in the parishes of Pajala and Korpilombolo in the north of Sweden. The 
corresponding birth rates were 6.25 per mille and 33.67 per mille.16 
Map 3 shows pronounced regional differences by län in Sweden during the 
decade 1931-40. The high fertility of the two northernmost län is especially 
conspicuous. The middle part of the country had the lowest rates. 
During the six-year period investigated by Wicksell and Quensel, the fall in 
48 
                                                     
16 Ibid. 
the birth rate was much more considerable in the countryside than in the 
towns. The towns, however, generally had a considerably lower fertility than 
the countryside.17 This is quite in accordance with differences in fertility 
usually observed between rural and urban areas in developed countries.18 
The discrepancy between rural and urban areas also reflects variation due to 
other socio-economic variables. The population occupied in agriculture in the 
1930's had a higher fertility than the rest of the population, even if income 
levels are considered.19 
There is, however, also an independent correlation between income and the 
number of children. People with the highest and lowest incomes tended to have 
the most children. There is an inverse correlation for the middle groups, so 
that the number of children becomes smaller as incomes rise.20 This is part of 
what W. Petersen describes as the typical pattern of modern Western societies: 
"The better a family is able to afford children the fewer children it has."21 
Nuptiality slowly rose during the 20th century after the great decline in the 
19th century; a lowering of the age at marriage is also evident but the 
development up to and during the 1930's is slow. Gustav Sundbärg also 
pointed out regional variations in nuptiality at the turn of the century. 
Recently, Sten Carlsson in his study of unmarried women in Sweden up to the 
turn of the century has shown that nuptiality also differed considerably 
between social and economic strata.22 Marriage rates were highest among 
daughters of landowning farmers, whereas women among the landless prole- 
tariat had low nuptiality rates and high ages at marriage. In the upper social 
strata of the population a considerable share of the women remained unmar- 
ried. 
Although no study of similar detail exists for the period of immediate 
interest, some of the differences found by Carlsson seem to have persisted. But 
changes have also occurred. In 1930 the lowest ages at marriage for women 
among the total population were found among the growing number of industri- 
al workers. However, even agricultural workers now married at younger ages. 
 
                                                     
17 Ibid., p. 81. Cf. also A. Myrdal 1941, pp. 48 ff 
18 See e.g., Petersen 1969, p. 496. 
19 Sjöstrand 1938, pp. 209 f. Cf. also A. Myrdal 1941, pp. 64 f. 
Bernhardt has made the same observation for Swedish farming and 
non-farming populations in the 1960's. Bernhardt 1971, pp. 
152f. 
20 Sjöstrand 1938, pp. 211 ff. A. Myrdal 1941, pp. 61 ff. Myrdal, however, 
also refers to the results of Edin & Hutchinson 1935, who in a study of 
Stockholm families married in 1920 to 1922, found a positive correlation 
between income and number of children. Myrdal suggests that a 
similar tendency is observable in the country as a whole in the special 
Swedish census of 1935-36. A. Myrdal 1941, p. 63. Cf. also Hyrenius 
1946. 
21 Petersen 1969, p. 498 
22 S. Carlsson 1977. 
Women belonging to the middle classes, especially those groups with a higher 
education, were still oldest at marriage, but the overall differences between the 
social groups upon which information can be obtained from the statistics are 
small, on the average about two years.23 
Regional differences are less striking than earlier; the lowest median age at 
marriage (24.3) is found in Västmanland län, the highest in the city of 
Stockholm (26.6). Differences between town and countryside seem, in a total 
perspective, to be insignificant—the median age at marriage for women in the 
countryside was 25.3 and for women in the towns 25.9.24 
The main characteristics of Swedish fertility and nuptiality in the 1930's 
may be summed up as follows: 
a. rapid fertility decline, in spite of an increasing frequency of marriage, to 
replacement rates far below unity. 
b. considerable regional variations in fertility. 
c. considerable, though decreasing, differences in fertility between town and 
countryside. 
d. influence of socio-economic variables such as income and social status on 
fertility resulting, on the whole, in an inverse correlation i.e., high income 
—low fertility. 
e. increasing nuptiality rates together with lower ages at marriage; noticeable 
but diminishing differences in nuptiality patterns due to social and econom- 
ic variables. 
To sum up—the demographic pattern that Swedish politicians wanted to 
influence was far from uniform. This fact should be remembered in the 
following discussion of the impact of Swedish population policies in the 1930's. 
It also provides the demographic context in which the Swedish population 
debate should be considered. 
Swedish Population Policy in the 1930's: 
Debate and Decisions 
Conflict between neo-Malthusians and pronatalists was a major feature of the 
population debate in Sweden. As mentioned above, a new law on contracep- 
tion was approved by the Swedish riksdag in 1910; the law was a victory by 
conservative and religious interests over the advocates of birth control. Infor- 
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23 Folkräkningen 1930, IX, pp. 13 f. and tab. 17. Quensel 1939. Cf. also A. 
Myrdal 1941, pp. 29ff. Myrdal, writing in a pronatalist context,  interprets the 
current  marriage rates and ratios as alarmingly low. 
24 Folkräkningen 1930, IX, p. 11. 
 
mation on and public sale of contraceptives were prohibited. But despite this 
repressive legislation the birth rate continued to fall. At the end of the 1920's 
voices in public debate warned of an imminent population decline. In 1931 the 
first pronatalist proposal was put forward in the Swedish riksdag. 
When the debate began hardly any pronatalist policies existed in Sweden, 
apart from the law on contraception of 1910 and the 1921 law on abortion. The 
latter was a considerable relaxation of the previous, very severe legislation of 
1864. Punishments for illegal abortions were, as in other European countries 
still imposed. The law, however, introduced the validity of medical reasons for 
abortion.25 
No system of family or children's allowances existed in Sweden; families in 
need had to resort to poor relief. A fee was charged at childbirth to be paid to a 
midwife at a home delivery, or to the hospital if delivery took place there. Only 
about 10 000 Swedish children had access to a day-care centre or a kindergar- 
ten. Most were founded on private initiative.26 
It might be mentioned that the situation of unmarried mothers and their 
children had been improved by a new law in 1917. Each case was treated 
individually and the interests of both mother and child were looked after by a 
specially appointed children's welfare officer.27 
Compared to other European countries, Sweden at the beginning of the 
1930's had very few policies designed positively to affect fertility by alleviating 
the economic and/or other burdens of families. From this point of view the 
debate on population started almost at zero. 
In 1931 the leader of the Conservative Party together with most of his party 
colleagues in the Second Chamber of the riksdag put forward a proposal 
demanding a redistribution of tax burdens in favour of married couples and 
families. Pronatalist motives were heavily stressed both in the proposal and in 
the ensuing debate in the riksdag. The proposal was not acted upon, how- 
ever.28 
In 1934 the Conservative Party periodical Medborgaren (The Citizen) again 
took up the question and advocated measures to alleviate the economic burden 
of children for families. The Conservative youth organisation stressed the 
importance of the problem in even stronger terms. In 1934 this organisation 
came into conflict with its mother party and split from it. In the following 
election it could muster three members of the riksdag. The youth organisation 
took a more right-wing stand than the Conservatives and was clearly influ- 
enced by National Socialist policies in Germany. The small Swedish National 
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Socialist Party followed the signals from the south in their population pro- 
gramme and pleaded for a "qualified" population growth, where that part of 
the population which was considered racially most valuable would answer for 
the demographic reproduction of the country.29 
The Agrarian Party also touched upon the population issue. Their pro- 
gramme particularly stressed the value of the rural population, both qualita- 
tively and quantitatively. The rural population was considered to represent the 
most valuable source of demographic renewal in the country. This view had its 
counterpart elsewhere, in France for instance and particularly in Germany. A 
Swedish economist discussed it at length in a book dealing with the Swedish 
population problem and agriculture.30 
Traditionally, the Conservatives, whether calling for restrictions on emigra- 
tion, immigration or contraception, had been the most active advocates of 
population policies. Their alarm for the population development is therefore 
far from surprising. The leftist parties in Swedish politics had, however, 
maintained a hostile or at least suspicious attitude towards such policies. 
The Myrdals and the Population Dilemma 
In 1934, however, a new phase in the debate was introduced when two 
prominent Social Democrats, Alva and Gunnar Myrdal, published a book 
entitled Kris i befolkningsfrågan (Crisis in the Population Question).31 Stressing 
the impending threat of population decline, the Myrdals demanded social 
reform as the only possible remedy for the situation. Neo-Malthusianism had 
played an important role in enabling the people to improve their living 
conditions by having fewer children. Now, however, society had to redistribute 
resources in order to give people the possibility of having the number of 
children they wanted—three per family was necessary to stop the threatening 
decline. But population policies should be based on the concept of "voluntary 
parenthood", and should not be coercive. The law on contraception of 1910 
ought therefore to be abolished, abortion to be liberalised and organised 
information on sexual matters to be introduced. It may also be mentioned that 
the Myrdals saw immigration as an unrealistic alternative to solve the problem 
of population decline.32 
. 
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In their book the Myrdals also put forward a whole range of proposals for 
measures in the area, mainly directed at the economically least well situated 
parts of the population. New mothers in poor circumstances should get special 
economic relief. Tax deductions ought to be introduced for families with 
children. Housing for poor families with many children should be subsidised. 
Child nutrition ought to be improved by free school meals and price reductions 
on essential provisions. Nurseries and day-care centres had to be created in 
order to provide children with early stimulation and working mothers with 
child care. The Swedish people should, moreover, get good information and 
education on problems concerning housing, nutrition, education and health.33 
All of the proposals thus had social policy content aimed at benefiting 
families, and especially families in the poorer strata of the population. The 
Myrdals on the whole succeeded in making their population policy programme 
acceptable to their party colleagues. At a Social Democrat party congress 
Gustav Möller, the Minister of Social Affairs, made the statement that he did 
not care about scaring the Liberal and Conservative parties with the threat of 
depopulation as long as it made them accept policies of social reform.34 
How did the Myrdals conceive the relation between population policy on 
one hand and social policy on the other? Both in Kris i befolkningsfrågan and 
later publications they stressed the importance of quality in a population when 
quantity was threatened. In her book on Swedish population policy, Nation and 
Family, Alva Myrdal thus made the following statement: "When the popula- 
tion fails to regenerate itself, the problem of how the human material may be 
preserved and improved becomes urgent."35 This position leads to a qualita- 
tive population policy with a social policy content—as evident from the propos- 
als in Kris i befolkningsfrågan. Alva Myrdal, does not, however, see the popula- 
tion motive as a means for social reform as Gustav Möller did in his above- 
mentioned statement. On the contrary, she points to the primacy of the 
population motive over social ones—"the population crisis must make us 
rethink all social objectives and programs" and "social policy had to be 
reconsidered in the light of the findings of demographic science".36 
The essence of the population decline is said to be a crisis in the fami- 
ly—"the family crisis represents the microcosmic view of what under the 
macrocosmic aspect stands out as the population problem". As a consequence 
 
. 
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"the task of our generation is to reintegrate the family in larger society".37 
This has to be done because, "influencing the whole structure of modern social 
life may be the only effective way of controlling the development of the family 
institution, including the factor of procreation".38A development of a com- 
plete family programme adapted to demographic planning is needed.39 
Alva Myrdal, however, later denounced this standpoint. In 1967 she writes 
in the preface to a new edition of Nation and Family: "I should now reduce any 
semblance I might have to a "pronatalist" approach; the fact that population 
trends in Sweden during the 1920's and 1930's if unchecked pointed in the 
direction of depopulation was a temporary thing, serving to dramatize the 
message of our work on formulating a social family policy".40 
Also Gunnar Myrdal maintained that social policy had to be governed by 
population policy motives, implying "simply an intensification of the impor- 
tant part of social policy which bears upon the family and children".41 Both 
Alva and Gunnar Myrdal explain this view with the central economic impor- 
tance of population—children are the "chief economic asset" of a nation.42 
The state has to realise the vital significance of this economic asset and 
accordingly invest in it—by social policy. Since population is the principal part 
of a nation's wealth, it is an investment that "can be even more profitable than 
investments in factoring and machines and other property which rust can 
corrupt and the moth consume".43 
Gunnar Myrdal also expresses the view that social policy may be a practica- 
ble means "in the fight to create a positive interest in the heart of the people for 
the fate of the population .. . Many citizens whom it would certainly be 
difficult to induce to adopt a positive attitude in the population question ... 
reveal an immediate understanding when they see that the means of achieving 
this policy correspond to what they have already been striving for on other 
grounds for decades."44 
The Myrdals predicted that population policy would become the critical 
political issue for decades to come; thus it had to govern social policy and to do 
this from a mainly qualitative stand on population.45 This, in turn, led to a 
strong emphasis on the family as a social institution. 
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The Myrdals accounted for their position on the population question in an 
unusually extensive and coherent manner. Apart from their influence on the 
Swedish population policies of the 1930's which will be discussed below, they 
also have a special significance in having more than anyone else propagated 
their views on Swedish population policy, its main goals and most important 
expressions to a domestic and international audience.46 
The publishing of Kris i befolkningsfrågan gave rise to an intense debate 
—books, pamphlets, and articles were published on the subject. The political 
opposition to the right greeted the Myrdals' contribution rather favourably, 
although their extensive social policy programme met with suspicion. From the 
far right the criticism was severe, however, for their refusal to introduce racial 
motives.47 To the left it also encountered suspicion and criticism, but for other 
reasons. The Communist Party denounced pronatalist policy from a Marxist 
point of view, maintaining that it was only aiming at securing the reproduc- 
tion of labour and military force in order to keep labour superfluous enough to 
keep wages down and supply soldiers in an atmosphere of military arma- 
ment.48  
Proposed and Adopted Policies 
Despite the Myrdals' book it was, however, not the Social Democrats, but 
rather the Conservative and Liberal parties that raised the question in the 
riksdag in 1935. The Conservatives put forward two bills on the issue, the 
Liberals likewise two.49 Even more active in the matter were the three riksdag 
members of the so-called Nationella gruppen (the National Group)—the repre- 
sentatives of the aforementioned former youth organisation of the Conservative 
Party. They introduced no less than six bills in the Second Chamber of the 
riksdag, one of them demanding the introduction of marriage loans after 
German fashion.50 
In the bills and during the ensuing debate the parties generally defined the 
problem as concerning no less than the continued existence of the Swedish 
people. The right-wing press eagerly followed up the debate and underlined 
. 
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the importance of the population problem; the liberal newspapers showed less 
interest.51 
It was generally argued that the expected population decline would lead to 
unfavourable economic consequences and that the age structure would be 
distorted with too great a proportion of old people as a consequence. The 
Conservatives and other right-wing politicians in particular stressed that 
population decline would mean that Sweden's existence as a nation was 
threatened—immigration was not seen as a desirable solution.52 
Roughly two alternative arguments dealing with the reasons for the decline 
of the birth rate are discernible. According to the first the decline in the birth 
rate was connected with a general rise in the standard of living, accompanied 
by a wish for a comfortable life and for other things instead of children. It also 
implied a "moral" deterioration (meaning the use of family limitation) and a 
diminishing feeling of responsibility for the nation and succeeding generations. 
According to the second view, the decline was caused by the current economic 
crisis. Unemployment and general economic difficulties made it impossible for 
families to have children. This explanation was propounded by the Social 
Democrats. The Liberals meant that the development was caused by a combi- 
nation of these two factors—that is, an ongoing long-term decline had been 
aggravated by the present crisis.53 
Many concrete proposals on policy measures were also launched: employ- 
ment security for women at childbirth, improved aid at delivery and increased 
economic support at childbirth, support to widows and other persons unable to 
provide for their children, special pensions for mothers with at least four 
children, free meals and free books for children at school, family insurance, tax 
reductions, improved housing, marriage loans, and better salaries for young 
employees with a higher education. 
The latter measure was proposed by the National Group which showed a 
particular concern for middle class groups and also used racist arguments. 
Also the Conservatives considered the middle class as a group of strategic 
importance for a qualitatively valuable demographic reproduction. 
The rural population was considered by all three parties to be of great 
importance. Out-migration from the countryside ought to be prevented by 
support to agriculture and by better housing (an investigation of housing in the 
countryside had recently revealed shockingly bad conditions).54 
Although the political opposition to the right was suspicious of the social 
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policy programme of the Social Democrats, many of their population policy 
proposals contained clear social policy elements. As the somewhat surprised 
Social Democrats pointed out, this meant something of a breakthrough for a 
new attitude in this respect within the Liberal and Conservative parties.55 
As a result of the various bills and decisions in the riksdag, a Royal Commit- 
tee on Population was appointed. The Minister of Social Affairs drew up a set 
of guiding principles for the committee. Through effective information on the 
population problem a sense of responsibility for the future of the nation was to 
be aroused among the Swedish people. Suggestions on appropriate measures to 
promote earlier marriages and increased fertility were to be made. Within the 
social policy area the main goal should be to lower the costs of having children 
for individual families, a goal which would also result in an improvement in 
the quality of the Swedish population. A large number of the proposals put 
forward in the riksdag were also mentioned in the guidelines. Politicians from 
the Conservative, Liberal, Agrarian and Social Democratic parties, with Gun- 
nar Myrdal being one of the most active, were included in the committee.56 
During the period 1935-38 the committee published no less than 18 reports. 
These reports contained the results of a large number of investigations as well 
as proposals for action in different areas. Trying to promote the idea of 
"voluntary parenthood", the committee proposed that information on birth 
control and sexual matters be given at birth clinics and maternity centres. 
Special courses and centres should also be created for this purpose. The law on 
contraceptives of 1910 ought to be done away with and all pharmacies should 
be obliged to stock contraceptives. The results of this far-reaching proposal 
were minimal; the already obsolete law against contraceptives was repealed in 
1938, and a very limited economic support for the instruction of high school 
teachers on sexual matters was implemented. 
Pronatalist motives, however, evidently influenced the new law on abortion 
of 1938. This law was prepared by a special committee, but the population 
committee when requested to comment upon it, rejected social grounds for 
abortion. Legislation and measures introduced in the birth control and abor- 
tion policy area thus promoted direct pronatalist goals rather than the idea of 
"voluntary parenthood" purposed by the Myrdals and the population commit- 
tee.57 
A main principle of the population committee was that society should pay 
the economic costs of childbirth. Free deliveries and free preventive mother 
and child care ought to be made available. The decision of the riksdag was 
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based on these principles; the implementation of the decision, however, rested 
with the county councils (landsting) which were and still are responsible for 
hospitals and medical care within their respective areas.58 
The committee also proposed the introduction of general allowances to every 
woman at childbirth, regardless of her economic position. This proposal was, 
however, rejected in the riksdag. Another proposal on maternity relief to 
mothers in "special need of help" was, on the other hand, passed and 
constituted one of the main results of the population committee. The major 
responsibility for the maternity relief programme was placed on the above-men 
tioned county councils. Maternity relief was to be given—preferably in 
kind—by the local child welfare boards. This reform, its background, imple- 
mentation and possible effects will be treated more extensively below. 
The committee also proposed a modified version of the marriage loan 
originally suggested by the National Group. Also in this case the committee 
met with success. A sum of 2 million Sw. crowns was initially granted and the 
handling of the loans was given to the National Bank of Sweden. The marriage 
loans constitute the most outspoken pronatalist reform proposed by the popu- 
lation committee and will also be treated extensively below. 
But the major and more expensive of the committee proposals were turned 
down. These proposals aimed at a redistribution of income between families 
with and families without children. Allowances were to be given in the form of 
free school meals, free clothing and shoes, free medicine, and what was 
classified as "essential food" to those in need. These allowances were to be 
given out not in cash, but in kind. This, in turn, implied that a rather 
complicated administration would have had to be created. Only an insignifi- 
cant amount of money was actually granted—some for free medicine, and even 
less, for free school meals. 
An important achievement was, however, the passing of a new law in 1939 
that provided job security for women at marriage, during pregnancy and 
childbirth. In this context the committee also proposed the building of day- 
care centres to facilitate the possibilities for mothers to work. But here nothing 
much happened as a result of the committee's efforts. In other respects, 
women's position in society may have been unfavourably influenced by the 
population debate and measures. As mentioned above, the new law on abor- 
tion in 1938 was no doubt influenced by pronatalist motives. The difficult 
position of unmarried mothers was also disregarded. The goal was to make 
unmarried mothers "respected" members of society, rather than to make 
abortion the acceptable alternative.59 
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Ann-Katrin Hatje, in analysing the achievements of the committee, found 
that ... "no comprehensive reforms were carried out in the latter part of the 
thirties".60 The areas in which the committee met with success had, moreover, 
generally been prepared in advance by other committees and governmental 
investigations.61 
Social policy and population policy motives were mixed in the work of the 
Committee on Population. A majority spoke for social policy, i.e., they advo- 
cated qualitative population policy goals, but there were also spokesmen for a 
rather radical quantitative pronatalism.62 
The hypothetical outcome of those policies of the committee, which were 
implemented will be considered in the following sections against the back- 
ground of the prevailing fertility patterns in Sweden. 
Population Policies and Fertility Patterns— 
a Theoretical Perspective 
The success of pronatalist policies is naturally dependent on how well they are 
adapted to the specific patterns of fertility which they are intended to affect. 
Conversely, different fertility (and marriage) patterns will require different 
types of policies. To facilitate a discussion of the relationship between fertility 
patterns and pronatalist policies in Sweden in the 1930's, a simplified outline 
of the different possibilities, as they apply to the Swedish context, are present- 
ed below. 
With regard to fertility, one extreme possibility is a pattern of non-planning. 
In reality, however, marriage plays a decisive role. Therefore such a fertility 
pattern will be defined as one where fertility within marriage is not subject to 
planning, control or limitation, but fertility outside marriage is subject to such 
control, as well as being considered unacceptable. The other extreme is a 
fertility pattern where planning, control and limitation are realised through- 
out. In practice, however, various degrees of consistency in planning and 
limitation are attainable. A pattern of consistent planning seems to have been 
realised in Sweden of today where access to birth control is general and 
abortions are free.63 
In the 1930's, however, Sweden was experiencing rapid fertility changes. As 
shown above, the Swedish fertility pattern was very varied in spite of a general 
rapid decline in overall fertility. Childbearing outside marriage, though no 
. 
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longer legally punished, was not socially accepted. Marriage thus served as one 
important regulator of fertility. Furthermore, the transition to a fertility pat- 
tern characterised by small families and the consistent use of birth control was 
still going on. Some groups in the population had fewer children than others. 
Especially in the large cities there were few children per family and completed 
family size was small. In other parts of Sweden, particularly in the north, the 
existing high fertility rates probably indicate that consistent family limitation 
was not general. The same might also have been true of specific strata among 
the population in areas otherwise showing low fertility. 
In a discussion on the impact of different types of population policies it 
becomes necessary to consider the determinants of fertility, particularly in the 
so-called developed countries. What determines desired and actual family size? 
Why do people limit the size of their families? What determines the extent to 
which birth control is used? 
The connection between poverty and large families is well-known.64 Lack of 
resources, a feeling of helplessness, short time horizons, poor communications 
between husband and wife, and usually also a difficult situation for wives, are 
among the determining factors. These determinants appear to be roughly 
applicable in Norrland, an area known for its poverty, and to the poor among 
the working classes both in the countryside and in the cities. An example of 
such behaviour is discernible among a group of agricultural workers who 
worked on the large estates in the middle of Sweden. These workers, paid in 
kind, were well-known for their poverty and for their large families. A study of 
these labourers has shown that while fertility fell among other rural groups, 
such as farmers, it remained persistently high among these workers.65 Their 
family patterns point towards the absence of or only the limited use of family 
planning. 
It seems likely that some groups in the Swedish population did not engage in 
family planning, and probably did not use birth control or only used it 
inconsistently. A regional variation, with Norrland as a high fertility area, and 
the large families among the rural population and among the poor in the cities 
support this assumption. 
Although the absolute size of those not engaging in family planning or 
engaging in it in only a limited fashion was not large, they are important both 
because the expected impact of pronatalist policies might be quite different for 
them than for others, and because one of the reforms under investigation here, 
housing for large families, focuses precisely on this kind of fertility pattern. 
The discussion on the determinants of fertility in advanced countries, how- 
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ever, concentrates mainly upon birth control, family limitation and the reasons 
for it. The role of access to knowledge of birth control practices and contracep- 
tives in affecting fertility will, however, not be considered. As mentioned 
above, knowledge of birth control practices was probably widespread in 
Swedish society and though access to contraceptives may have been more 
limited, they were rapidly being dispersed, not least as a result of the efforts of 
the neo-Malthusian organisations. Unfavourable attitudes, especially religious 
attitudes, to birth control may have affected some strata of the population, but 
these strata were probably numerically insignificant. 
In the vast literature on the determinants of fertility in advanced countries, 
the cost—benefit argument is one of the most often recurring. According to this 
argument the size of the family is principally determined by two factors: the 
cost of children and the benefit from children. In the economic oriented 
argument children are seen as "consumer goods" to be compared with, for 
instance, the buying of a car, a house or other commodities. The modern, 
industrialised society offers a variety of goods that may effectively compete 
with the wish to have children. Thus the cost of having children plays a central 
role. 
On the other hand, since parents in a modern society no longer obtained 
substantial additions to the family income from the work of their children, and 
are no longer dependent on them to the same extent for support in old age or in 
the case of illness, the economic benefit is less important.66 In pre-modern 
societies economic benefit is considered to have had far greater significance. 
Sociological arguments run much along the same lines, but a wider concept 
of "cost" and "benefit" is adopted. Sociologists stress the importance of the 
possible conflict between demands of children and the demands of other social 
values.67 In an open society, where social opportunities are numerous, the 
demands of the cost and care of children are presumed to have a negative 
influence on the social opportunities of parents (and also of children if there are 
too many). Social aspirations become factors of importance and "those with 
relatively small families can utilize for their advancement the energy and 
resources that otherwise would be devoted to raising additional children".68 A 
particular problem within this area is created by an increase in the amount of 
time spent by women working outside the home in a situation where childcare 
facilities are insufficient and sex roles unchanged.69 
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According to these very briefly outlined arguments, social and economic 
considerations would operate towards smaller families and lower fertility in a 
society like Sweden in the 1930's, where knowledge and acceptance of and 
access to birth control practices were already widespread. 
Inherent in the cost-benefit argument is the assumption that children are 
generally regarded as desirable, but that obstacles or competing social and 
economic objects influence parents so that they do not have as many children 
as they would like to had such competing objects or obstacles not existed. This 
assumption, in my opinion, excludes an alternative possibility that is of interest 
in this particular context. One must also consider the possibility, that a 
radically different type of family planning may exist, a type associated with 
those who already have had the children they want and those who do not want 
children under any circumstances.70 
One might theoretically distinguish between two different reasons for the 
existence of family planning in advanced societies: 
1. people are prevented from having the children they would like to have. 
2. people have had the number of children they want—if they wanted any at 
all. 
This means that, at least theoretically, we have to deal with three types of 
behaviour in the context of Sweden in the 1930's. The first is the more or less 
unplanned one, where marriage serves as the main regulator of fertility. The 
two others are the cases where people plan and limit their families, but where 
they plan and limit them for different reasons. 
What could then be the expected impact of different pronatalist policies 
when applied to these patterns? And what would the content of the policies 
have to be in order for them to be effective? Last, but not least, what kind of 
motives govern the implementation of such policies in each different circum- 
stance? 
Let us first look at the non-planning families, where marriage serves as the 
only regulator of fertility. It may sound like a paradox to talk of pronatalist 
policies in such a context, but in a society where such policies are decided on 
and implemented, they may also be aimed at these families and may, further- 
more, have an effect on them. 
The main way to increase the fertility of people with a non-planning family 
pattern would be by affecting nuptiality. By promoting early marriages and 
thereby lengthening the fertile period of women inside marriage, the number of 
children born should increase. Also within a fertility pattern where birth 
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control is applied only inconsistently such a policy would have an effect. Such 
a policy would from an economic point of view be cheap, since it would involve 
only a one-time cost for public sources. The actual cost of the children would 
be paid by the parents. 
But is such a policy compatible with the concept of voluntary parenthood, a 
concept developed by the Myrdals and the Committee on Population? This is 
doubtful, to say the least, since a policy of affecting marriage, though maybe 
not repressive in character, must be looked upon as a way of manipulating 
people into having children. Notwithstanding, as mentioned above, one of the 
most important ingredients of Swedish population policy in the 1930's was the 
marriage loan. In this case then, there is a conflict between the concept of 
voluntary parenthood and the reforms actually carried through. The point will 
be discussed further in the chapter on the marriage loans. It should also be 
remembered that the effect of measures affecting nuptiality are reversely 
correlated to the degree of birth control in use—the higher the use of birth 
control the lesser the effect on the fertility. 
Policies intended to affect a population with a widespread and consistent use 
of family planning will have to be directly aimed at increasing childbearing. 
But their content may vary considerably, not least due to whether they are 
directed at people that are prevented from having the children they want—re- 
gardless of how strong that wish may be—or whether they are aimed at people 
who do not want any (more) children. 
In both cases repressive policies such as prohibiting contraceptives and 
abortions are applicable. Such measures are, of course, not in conformance 
with the concept of voluntary parenthood. But as mentioned above, the 
abortion law of 1938 and the committee's consideration of the situation of 
unmarried mothers contained such elements. 
Policies intended to better conditions at childbirth, to alleviate the economic 
and other obstacles to having children, to provide care for children, etc., 
would, on the other hand, be in conformance with this concept. These are 
policies directed at people prevented from having the children that they would 
like to have. The law on job security for working women in 1939 belongs to this 
kind of policy. The same is true of maternity relief and improved housing for 
large families. These are naturally policies with a social policy content. 
To influence people to have more children than they want, or to influence 
them to have children when they would prefer to be childless would be harder 
to fit into the notion of voluntary parenthood. In this case the policies would 
have to be of the kind where children are "bought" with public money—the 
child will be seen almost exclusively as an economic asset for society or some 
part of society. No clear-cut policy of this kind can, however, be said to have 
been included in the Swedish policy measures carried through in the 1930's. 
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But considerations of this kind can be found in some of the views, expressed 
both by official authorities and politicians, on both maternity relief and 
improved housing on large families. 
Policy contents are ambiguous and vary depending on whose point of view 
is considered. These issues will be further discussed when the three policy 
measures concerning marriage loans, maternity relief and improved housing 
for large families are treated in detail in the following chapters. 
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